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Forthcoming in Transformations in American Legal History, vol. II 
(Alfred Brophy and Daniel Hamilton, ed.s.) 
 
 
 THE WARREN COURT, LEGALISM, AND DEMOCRACY: 
Sketch for a Critique in a Style Learned from Morton Horwitz 
 
William H. Simon 
 
 
 Morton Horwitz’s Transformation books developed a critical 
approach that elaborates the underlying premises of legal doctrine and 
compares them to suppressed or ignored alternative perspectives.  
However, Horwitz’s Warren Court book is largely an appreciation of the 
Court’s doctrine that accepts at face value its underlying premises and 
the judges’ claim to vindicate democratic values.  In this essay, I 
speculate on what a Transformation-style critique of the Warren Court 
might look like and suggest that the Court is vulnerable to criticisms 
analogous to those the Transformation books make of earlier doctrine.  I 
suggest that book ignores an alternative perspective on social justice 
that emerged clearly after the Warren Court era but was conceptually 
available during it. 
 
 Surely the most consistent theme in Morton Horwitz’s work is 
the critical portrayal of the evasion of substantive justice in legal 
discourse.  Time and again, Horwitz has explicated legal argument as a 
series of elaborately contrived detours away from questions of 
distributive fairness, equality, and solidarity that, to the professionally 
unencumbered mind, shriek for attention.   
 Horwitz’s book on the Warren Court is an exception.1  The book 
is largely a celebration of the Court’s, and especially Justice Brennan’s, 
achievements and an appreciation of the unfulfilled promise of their 
more ambitious pronouncements.  Yet, Horwitz has elsewhere 
acknowledged that the Warren Court was not immune to the temptations 
of evasion he analyzed in the rest of his work or in particular to three 
intellectual vices he often associated with it – formalism, individualism, 
and proceduralism.2  I refer to these vices collectively as "legalism". 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325328
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 Without disagreeing with Horwitz’s portrayal of the positive 
dimension of the Warren Court, I want to discuss some elements of a 
Horwitzian critique of the Court.  Such a critique would suggest that the 
doctrinal retreats and practical failings of the post-Warren Supreme 
Court were foreshadowed and enabled by the presence in the Warren 
Court's own cases of the vices of formalism, individualism, and 
proceduralism.   
 I focus on crude but probably uncontroversial stories about the 
development and practical application of three critical areas of Warren 
Court doctrine – race discrimination, criminal justice, and welfare rights.  
Each shows a trajectory of progressive promise and ultimate (but far 
from total) disappointment.   
 In each case, the disappointment is clear only after the nominal 
conclusion of the Warren Court in 1969.  Thus, it is debatable whether it 
is fair or illuminating to associate the practical failings with the earlier 
doctrines.  Perhaps the post-1969 developments occurred because of 
political re-alignment and, had the Court’s personnel not changed, 
doctrine would have evolved to address effectively the problems that 
emerged.  However, my intuition – for which I can offer only 
impressionistic support here – is that the problems that later emerged can 
be traced to legalist features of the early case law.3 
 The second element of a Horwitzian critique -- after the exposure 
of the vices of legalism -- is the elaboration of an alternative perspective 
on the issues in question that is suppressed in conventional narratives.  
Sometimes the alternative is an actual perspective that preceded the 
subject under scrutiny, such as the "just price" jurisprudence displaced 
by 19th century contract law.  Sometimes it is a hypothetical possibility -
- for example, subsidization of antebellum economic development 
through the tax rather than the tort system.  The function of recovering 
the suppressed alternative is to emphasize the contingency of the 
trajectory under focus (things could have gone differently) and to 
sharpen our normative assessment of it (some features of the alternative 
are comparatively attractive).   
 I close by invoking as an alternative to the Warren Court program 
Horwitz celebrates the program implicit in the re-orientation in public 
policy that occurred in the U.S. and the European Union in the 1990s 
that is often called "new governance."  Since it emerged clearly only 
after the Warren Court era, it is empirically a subsequent alternative.  But 
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since there is no reason to think that the program was not conceptually 
available during the Warren Court era, it could also be treated as a 
hypothetical contemporaneous alternative.  In any event, since the "new 
governance" program competes today with approaches associated with 
the Warren Court, the comparison is an important part of the assessment 
of the Warren Court's legacy.   
 The contrast between "new governance" and Warren Court 
implies broader issues about democracy.  Horwitz showed that the 
Warren Court doctrine was animated by a Progressive conception of 
democracy.  He portrays this vision as an attractive one, but he does not 
consider whether it has any plausible rivals within the Progressive 
tradition.  I suggest that it does have a plausible rival.     
 
 I. Promise and Disappointment: Three Stories 
 
 A. Race Discrimination4  
 
 The Court launched its struggle against government racial 
discrimination in Brown v. Board of Education by declaring de jure 
segregated schools to violate constitutionally-mandated equal protection.   
It applied the doctrine to other public services and facilities and to 
electoral systems.  After considerable delay, it encouraged judicial 
intervention against a variety of forms of official resistance and evasion.  
Congress complemented its activities with statutes prohibiting some 
forms of private discrimination, including in employment, higher 
education (where the institution received public funds), and housing. 
 These efforts contributed to the virtual eradication of open 
deliberate discrimination in the public sector and a more gradual 
reduction in the private sector.  By the 1970s they had contributed to a 
significant number of meaningfully integrated school systems, and they 
had opened up new job and housing opportunities for relatively better-off 
African Americans.  But the gains seemed to come slowly; at some 
point, they stalled, and in some areas – notably school desegregation – 
there was severe regression. 
 Doctrinally, the key question was how anti-discrimination norms 
would apply to racial disparities that were not provably the consequence 
of intentional discrimination by particular defendants.  The early success 
of the civil rights movement shifted contest from “disparate treatment” 
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cases to “disparate impact” cases.  In the latter, the only proof of 
discrimination was evidence that the challenged action had affected 
minorities worse than whites.  The challenged measures often seemed 
highly likely or even certain to have been influenced by racism.  On the 
other hand, racism may not have been the only or the predominant 
motivation.  In principle, there were legitimate reasons for, say, using 
traditional jurisdictional lines to draw school districts or requiring a high 
school degree for a bus driving job.  The fact that these actions 
foreseeably disadvantaged blacks disproportionately did not necessarily 
mean that they had been adopted for the purpose of creating the 
disadvantage or that the arguably legitimate reason was not of substantial 
weight.  Since it would often be unfeasible to resolve such questions 
conclusively, a lot depended on where the burden of proof was placed.  
With the partial exception of statutory employment discrimination cases, 
the court ultimately placed it squarely on plaintiffs. 
 More generally, the Court declined to interpret constitutional 
equal protection as a broad prohibition on the state’s implication in 
social structures of racial subordination, and instead interpreted narrowly 
as a kind of intentional tort.  It often demanded that the plaintiff show an 
intentional injury caused by a specific act or practice of a particular 
defendant.  This imposed often insuperable burdens of proof (where, for 
example, it was hard to isolate out the effects of discriminatory behavior 
from other negative influences on the plaintiff) and sometimes precluded 
effective relief (for example, in suburban school cases, interdistrict relief 
was forbidden even where it was the only effective relief if the 
culpability of all the districts could not be established).  
 
 B. Criminal Justice5 
 
 Elaborating the due process clause of the 14th amendment and 
“incorporating” the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth amendments, the court 
developed a series of doctrines designed to improve the fairness of the 
treatment of relatively powerless people in the criminal justice system.  
In particular, it prescribed constitutional restrictions mandating the 
provision of minimally effective defense to indigents and restricting 
coercive interrogation and search and seizure.  It enforced the latter 
through the “exclusionary rule” precluding admission of evidence 
obtained in consequence of violation of the doctrines.  It also developed 
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a complex series of doctrines that facilitated more or less routine federal 
court review of state court convictions. 
 The positive side of the Warren Court criminal justice story is 
that these decisions helped to change practices in ways that benefitted 
the people they were intended to benefit, and they contributed to a 
notable general increase in the professionalism of law enforcement.  But 
the negative side is that, again, change was much less than intended.  
Legislatures were stringy in funding public defenders, and the post-1969 
Court cut back on the earlier doctrines in ways that limited their practical 
effect.   
 Another part of the story involves the indirect undermining of 
defendants’ protections.  The Warren Court years were followed by a 
time of massive middle class anxiety about rising crime and loss of 
social control.  Conservatives were successful in using crime control 
issues to mobilize voters.  In office, they devoted major effort to trying 
to cut back the Warren Court doctrines, but their most successful project 
was to legislate dramatic increases in punishment.  Prescribed 
punishments, which the Warren Court had left virtually unregulated by 
the Constitution, soared.  This escalation in turn generated a great 
increase in prosecutorial discretion, which the Court had also left largely 
unregulated constitutionally.  When threatened punishments go up, the 
minimum probability of acquittal that would lead a defendant to choose 
trial goes up as well.  Even a small risk of a disastrous punishment will 
induce many defendants to accept a plea bargain.   
 In the associated bargaining process, Warren Court procedural 
claims are at best assets to be traded for reduced charges.  They may 
have significant value to the defendant, and the fact that prosecutors 
must offer concessions for them may create some incentives that deter 
the abusive practices that give rise to these claims.  Nevertheless, the fact 
that the potential sanctions are often higher than the prosecutor would 
want to impose means that she can trade down without great cost.  
Moreover, the procedural doctrines simply do not address the most basic 
sources of unfairness in the system – excessive punishment and 
unchecked prosecutorial discretion. 
 
 C. Welfare Administration6   
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 In the pre-1960s welfare system, street-level bureaucrats 
exercised broad discretion, partly by design and partly as a consequence 
of lax supervision.  They sometimes used this discretion to tailor 
assistance in ways that helped recipients; more often, they used it 
arbitrarily and abusively. 
 The Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) is often taken 
to establish constitutional rule-of-law values in welfare programs.  It 
repudiated the “right-privilege” distinction in constitutional law, required 
pre-termination hearings with respect to public assistance, and specified 
the minimum requisites of such hearings.  (As a narrow practical matter, 
the key holding was the requirement of hearings prior to termination; the 
Social Security Act had required hearings that would have satisfied the 
other aspects of the decision since 1935.) 
 Welfare programs responded to Goldberg by creating or 
strengthening corps of hearing officers independent of line 
administration.  The officers typically had strong professional 
credentials, sometimes as lawyers.  The quality of their performance in 
adjudicating recipient claims tended to be high.  Civil legal aid 
programs, which expanded during this period, often made substantial 
efforts to provide representation to claimants in these hearings.  The rate 
of decisions in favor of recipients in these hearings was substantial, and 
not only where the claimants were represented. 
 So far, so good.    On the other hand, you cannot say, as you can 
with criminal justice, that the Court’s decisions contributed to a general 
professionalization of practice in the welfare area.  The effects of 
constitutional welfare jurisprudence were rigorously confined to the 
realm of adjudication, and while that realm functioned well, only a small 
fraction of cases ever reached it.  With the major exception of the Social 
Security Disability programs, appeal rates from negative case actions 
remained very small.  There is good reason to believe that a substantial 
fraction of unappealed decisions were erroneous.  
 Most recipients’ fates were left to the realm of routine 
administration.  This realm was dramatically transformed, but not to the 
benefit of recipients.  In essence, administration was bureaucratized.  
Discretion was squeezed out of the frontline worker’s job by detailed and 
inflexible rules, Tayloristic supervision, and the redesign of the job to 
exclude people with qualifications or aspirations as social workers.   
Recipients were subjected less to coercive intrusion into their private 
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lives and more to demands of paper-pushing and bureaucratic hoop-
jumping.  Negative decisions were less likely to result from recipients’ 
private conduct and more likely to result from their failure to comply 
with documentation or verification requirements or to comply with the 
requirements of work or child support enforcement programs.  In 
essence, bureaucratic burdens on recipients were dramatically increased, 
while both the capacity and the inclination of frontline workers to assist 
them were reduced.   
 Administrators tended to insist that the spheres of adjudication 
and line administration were mutually impervious.  For example, they 
instructed frontline workers that they were to ignore hearing decisions in 
all cases other than the one in which it was handed down.  An applicant 
or recipient unfairly treated by line administration had a good chance of 
getting relief if she could get her claim into the hearing process, but 
many claimants were unable to do so, often because of the very kind of 
misconduct the hearing process was supposed to protect against.  The 
Supreme Court squarely rejected arguments that due process might 
impose requirements on line administrative practices in Schweiker v. 
Hansen (1981) – a little known case that is as important as Goldberg.  
Schweiker refused to recognize either as a matter of constitutional or 
federal common law an estoppel principle that would afford relief to a 
person who had been wrongly told by a line worker that she was 
ineligible for benefits and in consequence, when she did file later, was 
denied for failure to comply with timeliness requirements.  Schweiker is 
not a Warren Court case.  It was decided in 1981, and Justices Marshall 
and Brennan dissented.  But the decision did not require overruling or 
distinguishing any Warren Court decision.  Those decisions were 
focused on hearings, not line administration.  
 
 II. Critique 
 
 A. Formalism 
 
  Formalism is the privileging of semantics or abstract logic over 
purpose and context.  The paradigmatic instance of modern 
constitutional formalism is the invocation in the Burger and Rehnquist 
eras of the Equal Protection Clause and Brown as authority against 
affirmative action.  However, I do not see this move as facilitated by any 
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defect in the Warren Court decisions.  Brown is explicitly about racial 
classifications that cause stigmatic harm and implicitly about the 
oppression of minority group members.  Affirmative action is readily 
distinguishable, and the later anti-affirmative action cases seem a strong 
departure from Brown.• 
 I do not think we can say the same thing about the role of Warren 
Court doctrine in grade school desegregation efforts.   The Warren Court 
education cases were ambiguous, and as things played out, they proved 
compatible with various kinds of formalism that influenced both the right 
and the left. 
 First, there was the formalism that defined discrimination solely 
in terms of consciously and actively invidious official conduct, and thus 
excluded conduct that passively accepted or unreflectively reproduced 
social structures that were the product of private racism or were 
generally perceived by both whites and blacks as implementing the 
subordination of blacks.  This understanding leaves de facto and 
disparate-impact discrimination -- which for a long time has meant most 
discrimination -- unredressed.  It also meant that the remedy for past de 
jure discrimination might consist of little more than a shift to facially 
neutral practices that in fact involve very little effective integration. 
 Second, there was the formalism that measured desegregation in 
terms of government efforts to achieve racial mixing without regard to 
their results.  At some point, the combination of housing segregation 
                                                 
•  On the other hand, Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), a Brennan opinion with 
Marshall joining, strikes me as manifesting a formalism analogous to that of the anti-
affirmative action opinions.  The case held invalid a Social Security rule that provided 
greater benefits to the dependent spouses of male wage earners than to those of female 
wage earners.  Unnoted in the decision is the fact that virtually its only practical effect 
was to provide a class of male government employees with a second set of publicly-
financed retirement benefits.  (Few men employed in the private sector could qualify 
for dependents’ benefits even after the decision because of the rule that a person gets 
only the higher of his own Social Security benefits or the benefits he would be entitled 
to as a dependent.  Government employees up to that time were not covered by Social 
Security; public pensions were designed to compensate for this exclusion.)  The 
discrimination the court struck down was clearly intended to benefit women dependents 
and clearly did so.  The court objected that it gave women wage-earners a lower return 
on their contributions, but it is debatable whether that was the most plausible 
perspective from which to view the program.  See William H. Simon, “Rights and 
Redistribution in the Welfare System,” 38 Stanford Law Review 1431, 1478-84 (1986). 
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(unredressable because ostensibly the product of private decisions) and 
the restriction on interdistrict remedies (forbidden unless invidious 
discrimination could be proved against all districts) made it very hard to 
achieve meaningful desegregation.  Some lower federal courts insisted 
on integration even in situations where such efforts were counter-
productive (by producing chaos and white flight), and in majority-
minority districts they labored desperately to contrive intricate decrees 
that might attract white students from the suburbs.  The Supreme Court 
eventually condemned such decrees as ineffective. 
 Third, there was the formalism that interpreted equality as 
satisfied by racial mixing and perhaps economically equal inputs without 
regard to the quality of educatiion.  When civil rights groups began to 
split over the relative priority of what now appeared to be the at least 
partially competing goals of desegregation and educational adequacy in 
inner city schools, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
justified its strong pro-integration stance on the ground that it was 
compelled by Warren Court precedent.  Our responsibility is to vindicate 
“constitutional standards”, its lawyers said, and those standards mandate 
integration “wholly without regard to educational consequences.” 7 
 Consider now a formalist theme in the criminal procedure sphere.  
Is the exclusionary rule entailed by the 4th and 5th amendments, or is it 
simply one acceptable means a state can use in mitigating unreasonable 
interrogation and search and seizure practices?  The Warren Court 
decisions were generally interpreted sympathetically by liberals and 
harshly by conservatives as reflecting the first view.  Conservatives have 
criticized the decisions along precisely the lines that Arthur Corbin 
criticized Samuel Williston’s categorical embrace of expectation 
damages in contract law.8  They pointed out that the substantive rights in 
question did not logically entail any particular remedy.  They argued that 
the rule had a limited effect on police conduct.  (For example, it only 
kicked in with investigations where charges were filed; it was widely 
nullified by perjury in some jurisdictions.)  There are many other, 
perhaps more cost-effective, ways of protecting the relevant 
constitutional rights – for example, requiring taping of confessions -- that 
the court has never required.  And like Corbin, the commentators pointed 
to an underground of cases that tacitly deviated from the doctrine in 
highly defensible ways (for example, permitting the use of tainted 
material for impeachment).  
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  B. Individualism  
 
 “[O]ur legal system,” Horwitz has written, “is overwhelmingly 
geared to a conception of redressing individual grievances, not of 
vindicating group rights or of correcting generalized patterns of 
injustice.”9 
 In substantive discrimination law, we see this orientation in the 
tort approach that requires the plaintiff to show a specific injury to her 
and to trace it to specific consciously invidious conduct by the defendant.  
Such doctrines immunize a substantial measure of intentional 
discrimination from liability by making the burdens of proof too high.  
They limit the ability of group members to vindicate group interests.  
And they disclaim any affirmative duty on the part of government to 
remedy the effects of racial subordination that cannot be traced narrowly 
to past wrongful official conduct.   
 In criminal justice and welfare, the individualist orientation is 
reflected in the pre-occupation with “end-of-the-pipe” remediation 
through individual claims for past wrongful conduct in adjudicatory 
procedures.  This orientation ignores or denies the “management side of 
due process”.10  It fails to vindicate potential claims that cannot be raised 
in the required form because the victim lacks the knowledge or resources 
to do so.  It encourages officials to bifurcate their practice between a 
realm of “trouble cases” to which the prospect of judicial supervision 
requires them to devote special attention and the realm of routine 
administration where they do not anticipate having to account for their 
treatment of the disadvantaged. 
 Of course, these problems are mitigated by the practice of 
“structural injunction” that emerged from the convergence of class action 
and equity practice under and after the Warren Court.  Many have noted 
that the development of these procedural doctrines has put pressure on 
the individualist premises of substantive doctrine.  At the same time, 
however, substantive individualism constrains remedial practice.  A 
representative plaintiff who can show individual standing and prove an 
officially condoned practice that violates a clear duty often gets 
structural relief.  But standing burdens are sometimes preclusive, and 
where the complaint alleges not, deliberate violation of explicit duty, but 
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failure to proactively monitor to prevent violations or to take effective 
initiative to provide mandated benefits, systemic relief is often denied. 
 Here again, it is debatable how much these limitations are 
grounded in Warren Court doctrine.  Much of the relevant authority is 
post-1969.  Some have found a fairly radical innovation implicit in the 
Warren Court’s equity practice in civil rights cases.11  But the “implicit” 
qualification is important.  Much of the case law is pre-occupied with 
technical matters.  It’s notable that when Abram Chayes conceptualized 
the “public law action”, he relied hardly at all on Supreme Court cases 
(other than recent ones cutting back on remedial practice) and credited 
much of the innovation he discussed to lower court judges.12  
 
 C. Proceduralism 
 
  The most striking manifestation of Warren Court proceduralism 
is in criminal justice.  The exclusionary rule was indifferent to 
substantive guilt or innocence.  It was popularly believed to cause guilty 
people to go free, and while the belief tended to be exaggerated, it was 
not wrong.  Most of the Warren Court precedents were undoubtedly 
directly useful disproportionately to guilty people.   
 At the same time, the Warren Court made comparatively little or 
no effort to subject to constitutional regulation: (1) the quantum of 
evidence necessary to support a conviction; (2) prosecutorial discretion; 
and (3) proportionately of punishment.  There were clearly major 
systemic abuses that could have been addressed under each of these 
rubrics.  The Court’s failure to develop substantive doctrinal checks put 
more pressure on its procedural doctrines to remedy injustice in the state 
criminal process.  The Court developed the habeas remedy into a tool of 
virtually routine review, but in principle the bases for review were 
mostly procedural.  Thus, defense lawyers had to squeeze claims of 
injustice into procedural claims.  (Two friends who volunteered to do 
habeas appeals in the 1980s for clients they thought were innocent told 
me very similar stories about oral arguments in which they sought to 
inspire the panels to pay more attention to their routine procedural claims 
by asserting that here was a case in which the claimants were probably 
innocent and were told testily on each occasion to refrain from detouring 
to “irrelevant” matters.)  When Alan Dershowitz won a reversal of Claus 
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von Bulow’s conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient 
to support it, he plausibly described his strategy as daring and risky.13  
 The cost in terms of political legitimacy of criminal justice 
proceduralism was enormous.  Political demagoguery over crime control 
readily focused on federal court doctrine, not just because of the myth 
that it was freeing large numbers of criminals, but because of the tension 
between the Court’s proceduralism and popular values of substantive 
justice.  One measure of this cost is the extent to which reformers 
ultimately increased the political traction of their arguments when they 
re-framed their critique of the system around substantive justice values – 
or as they put it, “innocence.”  A major landmark was the death penalty 
moratorium declared in 2000 by the Republican governor of Illinois on 
the expressed basis that it appeared that a substantial number of prisoners 
on death row might be innocent.  This move was clearly a departure from 
the Warren Court approach. 
 The Warren Court’s approach to welfare was also proceduralist.  
Race and gender issues aside, its main concerns were hearing rights.  
Justice Brennan did apply the fleeting “irrebutable presumption” doctrine 
to the food stamp program in U.S. v. Murray (1972), but that seed bore 
little fruit.  He and Justice Marshall dissented from the denial of the 
equal protection claim about AFDC classifications in Dandridge v. 
Williams (1970).  Had the liberal justices prevailed, they would have 
produced more rigorous requirements for programmatic classifications.  
But even this would have been a far cry from a substantive requirement 
to satisfy “minimum needs,” about which liberal lawyers theorized and 
which a few state courts found in state constitutions.  Moreover, what 
was arguably the Supreme Court’s most radical step toward substantive 
welfare rights was not in any sense a Warren Court decision.  This was 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Youngberg v. Romeo (1982), holding that 
treatment of a disabled child in state custody on a paternalistic rationale 
must be “based on a professional judgment.”  Although formulated in the 
relatively uncontroversial context of people in state custody, it had the 
potential to be applied more broadly, and in some respects it has been.  It 
seems an important step in the “soft process” approach to welfare rights 
that has been developed especially in Canada and South Africa.14 
 
 III. Post-Warren Court Approaches and Democracy 
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  Courts evade questions of substantive justice, not only because 
of ideological bias, but also because of theoretical limitations.  In 
particular, they shrink from the formidable problem of line-drawing that 
substantive justice values seem to present.  Even among those who agree 
in principle on such matters, there is nothing approaching consensus on 
how one determines “minimum needs” or fair punishment or reasonable 
group access to positions of privilege.  Once such standards were 
articulated, experience would require their frequent revision and 
adjustment, and courts have neither the mandate nor the qualifications to 
undertake such tentative and exploratory norm-setting.  Thus, it has 
seemed inevitable to many that the courts would shrink from direct 
engagement with substantive justice. 
 In fact, however, a distinctive approach that avoids these 
problems emerged in the 1990s in the United States and the European 
Union. In the U.S., it is exemplified in the area of race by the “new 
accountability movement” in education, including the No Child Left 
Behind Act, and by the proactive “benchmarking” practices in 
employment discrimination compliance; in the area of criminal justice, 
by the reforms inaugurated in the name of the “innocence movement” 
and by settlements in various police abuse cases; and in welfare, by 
“evidence-based” social work and innovative forms of supervision that 
were especially visible in some litigation-induced reforms in the child 
welfare area, and analogous developments in environmental and health 
and safety regulation..15 
 In the “experimentalist” approach, courts avoid the problems of 
line-drawing by refusing to draw them.  Instead, they induce relevant 
stakeholders to draw them collaboratively in a more open, disciplined, 
and reflexive process than would otherwise occur.  The stakeholders 
define the goals of the effort, including fairness aspirations; at the same 
time they define processes and measures for ongoing assessment of 
progress toward their goals, and for revising them in the light of 
experience.  Some of the key elements of the approach are: 
 -- Judicially-defined “penalty defaults” that, instead of specifying 
what the defendants must do, prescribe what will happen if defendants 
fail to negotiate a resolution with the plaintiffs 
 -- Monitoring processes and indicators that prescribe how 
progress under the negotiated regime will be assessed  
 14
 -- Proactive error detection processes that treat instances of 
noncompliance diagnostically as symptoms of systemic problems rather 
than as “trouble cases” to be resolved in isolation  
 -- Transparency requirements that open the regime to ongoing 
participation by the plaintiffs and to more general public scrutiny 
 -- Minimum performance standards based on observed actual 
performance among governmental actors in comparable situations 
 -- Duties to reconsider and revise goals and processes in the light 
of experience. 
 Many of the regimes that reflect the "new governance" view have 
been established by statute or regulation, but some have emerged from 
institutional reform litigation.  Moreover, there is arguably an underlying 
conception of constitutional right implicit in all of them.  At the most 
general level, the core right is an entitlement to have one's interests in 
some area of public responsibility or activity considered in a process that 
is responsive and accountable.  "Responsive" implies respectful 
consideration of the relation of the claimant's interests to the relevant 
public purposes by qualified decisionmakers with at least minimal 
participation by the claimant.  "Accountble" implies a reasoned 
explanation by the decisionmakers, review of decisions in ways that 
provide rich assessments of both individual cases and the system as a 
whole, and transparent procedures of systemic self-assessment and self-
correction. 
 The prima facie case of a violation of this type of public law right 
is a showing of, first, the state's chronic failure to meet relevant standards 
of performance in the area, and second, immunity of the system to 
conventional forces of political correction.  The remedy that follows 
from a finding of liability is not a judicially-imposed code, but a judicial 
order that the system negotiate and implement with the claimants and 
other stakeholders a reform program that is accountable. 
 Such efforts are linked to those of the Warren Court in their 
concern for the well-being of disadvantaged people; in their general 
aspiration to reduce racial subordination, police abuse, and oppression 
and incompetence in welfare provision; and in their grounding in an 
ambitious conception of democracy.  But in many respects these 
developments seem to break with the Warren Court.   
 15
 Considered as jurisprudential phenomena, new governance 
regimes seem less legalistic, or at least differently legalistic, than the 
Warren Court. 
 New governance regimes seen less prone to formalism in three 
respects.  They tend to derive conduct standards, not analytically from 
text or consensus, but experimentally from observations of actual 
performance under experimental conditions.  Moreover, they focus the 
attention of officials and stakeholders on governing purposes and 
appraise their performances in terms of their success in achieving those 
purposes.  And their interpretations are explicitly provisional and 
contestable.   
 The new governance approach shares with the Warren Court an 
ethical individualism that values personal dignity and aspires to respect 
and accommodate "difference".  But its institutional architecture seems 
less individualistic.  It is less focused on resolution of individual claims.  
It sees fair process as requiring, not just fair claims resolution, but also 
audit processes that sample across the program even where beneficiaries 
have not complained.  Moreover, it insists that findings of errors be 
treated, not only as grounds for individual relief, but as systems of 
potential systemic malfunctioning.    . 
 The newer systems are explicitly proceduralist, but in different 
ways than the Warren Court.  First, the Warren Court's proceduralism 
was focused largely on the legislative process and the process of 
individual adjudication.  In effect, it tacitly accepted the traditional 
liberal separation of enactment and enforcement.  Rules get made in the 
legislature and applied in adjudication.  Adjudication is backward-
looking in the sense that it measures compliance in terms of fidelity to 
previously announced rules.  But in new governance, the key focus is on 
on-going processes of elaboration, assessment, and correction.16  These 
processes are not strictly legislative.  They do produce rules or 
interpretations of rules, but the rules are intended to be revised far more 
quickly and easily than conventional legislative and administrative rule-
making processes contemplate.  And while, they do sometimes focus on 
particular cases, they cases are treated diagnostically as evidence of 
systemic performance.  
 Moreover, the range of public action to which the new regimes 
apply their proceduralism is considerably different than that of the 
Warren Court.  The new regimes treat procedurally both issues that the 
 16
Warren Court treated substantively and issues that the Warren Court 
treated as non-justiciable.  The Warren Court struggled to derive 
substantive norms on such matters as the permissibility of racially 
exclusionary practices or the reasonableness of search-and-seizures.  At 
the same time, it treated as non-justiciable or left unregulated such 
matters as the adequacy of education or welfare benefits or the 
proportionality of punishment and prosecutorial discretion.  The new 
regimes address all these issues procedurally, inducing and enforcing 
requirements of participation, transparency, monitoring, and self-
correction. 
 Some of these new regimes originate in legislative initiatives; 
some originate in court cases.  All of the problems they address seem 
susceptible to judicial intervention designed to induce the types of 
procedures the new regimes involve.  Such procedures might form the 
basis of a conception of constitutional welfare rights.  Indeed, one way of 
interpreting the South African Constitutional Court's much-admired by 
quite vague cases on housing and medical care rights is as a step toward 
an experimentalist conception. 
 Finally, Horwitz has shown that Warren Court jurisprudence rests 
on a vision of democracy.  It remains to ask how contested or contestable 
this conception is.  Horwitz situates Warren Court democracy in the 
American Progressive tradition, broadly understood.  Is it the only 
important conception of democracy (important either in the historical 
sense of influential or in the normative sense of worthy of respect) within 
that tradition?  My view is that it has a rival, and that the rival is implicit 
in the new governance regimes. 
 The Warren Court conception of democracy is in the tradition of 
John Stuart Mill or Jurgen Habermas.  Its rival is in the tradition of John 
Dewey.  Both conceptions emphasize a robust civil society and a fair 
electoral process.  However, they differ along two dimensions.   
 First, Mill and Habermas insist strongly on the separation of 
politics and administration.  For them, the broadest form of popular 
political participation is the indirect kind that occurs through debate and 
agitation in the civil sphere; direct participation is limited to voting.  
They appear to identify more direct forms of participation with anarchy 
or clientalism.  The distinction between politics and administration is 
foreign to Dewey.  Dewey, however, never elaborated how popular 
participation in administration could occur in a disciplined, accountable 
 17
manner. The new governance regimes of the post-Warren Court years 
substantiate Dewey's abstract intuition with concrete examples of how 
this might be accomplished.17   
 A second axis of difference concerns the role of consensus.  
Warren Court jurisprudence is rooted in constitutional text and 
background social consensus.  Like Mill and Habermas, it treats 
consensus as an end-point or at least a resting point.  In contrast, Dewey 
urges that consensus be treated as a set of hypotheses that require testing.  
Indeed, the most central concern of Deweyan politics is the tendency of 
shared understandings that originally summarized experience to congeal 
in ways that blind people to new experience.  A Deweyan democracy 
thus needs institutions that challenge and destabilize consensus.  Again, 
the new regimes give concreteness to this idea.   
 
 IV. Conclusion 
 
 As matters of both history and progressive politics, it is a 
important to assess the extent to which the vices of legalism can be 
found in the Warren Court's jurisprudence and the extent to which these 
vices contributed to the failures of its doctrines.  In this effort, the recent 
"new governance" regimes are a useful heuristic.  They offer a contrast 
that brings out some distinctive features of the Warren Court's approach.  
And some may conclude that they illustrate an approach that transcends 
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